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SUBSTITUTING SECURE DETENTION FOR
SHELTER CARE: AN ILLEGAL DEPRIVATION OF
LIBERTY
Susan M. Johlie*
INTRODUCTION

Judges sitting on the Superior Court of the District of Columbia routinely order
children into secure detention who require no more restrictive confinement than
that provided by shelter care. Despite a statutory presumption against detention,
and a superior court rule that prohibits substituting secure detention for shelter
care,' the District inappropriately places children into secure detention simply
because there is a lack of bed space in youth shelter houses. The deprivation of
liberty that occurs when a juvenile is placed in secure detention rather than shelter
care is required neither for the protection of the community nor for the welfare of
the child. Moreover, in light of Supreme Court precedent, the use of secure
detention as an expedient administrative alternative to shelter care placement
violates the detained youth's Fifth Amendment due process liberty interests.'
Finally, the Jerry M. v. District of Columbia" consent decree grants District of
Columbia children a liberty interest which mandates additional protection.
Section I of this Note argues that District of Columbia law prohibits ordering
children into secure detention who do not satisfy the statutory criteria for secure
detention. Section II analyzes whether the use of secure detention for children who
require shelter care comports with due process. Finally, Section III suggests that
the Jerry M. consent decree may provide an independent legal basis for an

* The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial and substantive contributions of Professor Joseph
Tulman and third-year law students Charles Smith and George Dazzo of the District of Columbia School of
Law.
1. "A child shall not be placed in detention prior to a factfinding hearing or a dispositional hearing
unless...." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(a) (1989 Repl.) (emphasis added). Section 16-2310(c) pro,-ides that
the relevant factors to consider can be found "as implemented by rules of the Superior Court." Id. § 162310(c).
2. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(b)(3) provides that -[n]o [child) who is judged to be in need of shelter
care under D.C. Code § 16-2310(b) and the provisions of this Rule shall be placed in detention, unless the
respondent's detention is independently justified under paragraph (a) of this Rule." Rule 106(b)(1)(iii)
specifies that shelter care is "additional supervision [for the child] ... short of secure custody."
3. See infra section II.
4. Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 24. 1986) (consent
decree).
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individual child to challenge the substitution of secure detention for shelter care.

I.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW PROHIBITS ORDERING SECURE DETENTION FOR
CHILDREN WHO Do NOT SATISFY THE STATUTORY CRITERIA

Pending a factfinding hearing, children who are arrested and not released into
the immediate custody of a parent or guardian are detained overnight.5 At an
initial hearing, a Family Division judge will either 1) release the child (with or
without conditions)'; 2) order home detention, which does not require a probable
cause hearing;" 3) order shelter care;8 or 4) order secure detention.9 An order for
shelter care or secure detention requires a probable cause hearing.10 In considering
whether to detain a child in secure detention prior to a factfinding hearing, a judge
must follow the mandate of Section 16-2310(a):
A child shall not be placed in detention prior to a factfinding hearing or a
dispositional hearing unless he is alleged to be delinquent or in need of
supervision and unless it appears from available information that detention is
required - (1) to protect the person or property of others or of the child, or
(2) to secure the child's presence at the next court hearing.11

If the judge finds probable cause and the child satisfies the detention criteria, the
judge may order detention. 12 There is, however, a statutory presumption against
5. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(a) (1989 Repl.). The court conducts initial hearings every day except
Sunday. For a child arrested and detained on Sunday or after a "cut-off" hour on Saturday, the initial hearing
occurs on Monday.
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(d)(1)(B) (1989 Repl.).
7. Id. § 16-2312(d)(2)(A)-(C).
8. Id. § 16-2312(f). "Shelter care" is defined as the "temporary care of a child in physically
unrestricting facilities." Id. § 16-2301(14). There are currently 12 shelter houses in the District, organized
according to age and gender. This form of community detention allows the children to live in the community,
attend school or work, and return to the house in the evening. Youth shelter house detainees usually have
weekend home visits as well.
9. Id. § 16-2312(f). Detention is defined as "the temporary, secure custody of a child." Id. § 162301(13). Oak Hill (located in Laurel, Maryland) is the only secure juvenile facility for the District of
Columbia.
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(e) (1989 Repl.).
11. Id. § 16-2310(a)(l)-(2) (emphasis added).
12. Unless probable cause is established and the criteria are satisfied, the judge must release the child
forthwith. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(d)(1)(B) (1989 Repl.). If secure detention is justified, "the person
making the detention decision may nevertheless consider whether the respondent's living arrangements and
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detention.'" In addition, judges are further restricted through District of Columbia

Superior Court Juvenile Court Rule 106(a)(l)-(3), which provides "relevant
factors" for judges to consider when making the secure detention decision."

degree of supervision might justify release pending adjudication." D C SUPER CT Juv R 106(a)(5).
13. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(a)-(b) (1989 Repl.).
14. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(l)-(3). Rule 106(a) (as published in 123 Daily Wash. L. Rptr.
1441-76 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 24-26, 1995)) provides:
(a) Detention. No chifd respondent shall be placed in detention prior to a factfinding heanng or a
dispositionat hearing unless trethe respondent is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supertision
and unless it appears from available information that detention is required to protect the person or
property of others or of the dsitd respondent, or to secure the chtilds respondent's prmence at the
next court hearing.
(1) In determining whether detention is necessary to protect the person of others. the futueiu,
ftctos shall
be demed relevant factors include but are not linited to the follohtng.
(i) Record of chilts the respondent's previous offenses against persons,
(ii) Record of Uhild's the respondent's previous weapons offenses,
(iii) Nature and circumstances of the pending charge,
(iv) Nature and circumstances of other pending charges, if they involve an offense against the
person or a weapons offense,
(v) Allegations of danger or threats to witnesses, and
(vi) Emotional character and mental condition of the chitt respondent.
(2) In determining whether detention is necessary to protect the property of others from serious
loss or damage, Lh f llugu 5 f4 tLWam.deemed relevant factors include but are not limited to the
following:
(i) Record of child's respondent's previous offenses against the property of others, if serious loss
or damage was involved,
(ii) Nature and circumstances of the pending charge, and
(iii) Nature and circumstances of other pending charges, if they involve serious loss or damage
to the property of others.
(3) In determining whether detention is necessary to protect the child's respondent'sown person.
thtfolowng fat
dumed relevant factors include but are not limited to the following:
(i) Narcotics addition by chld respondent or other m, a.d hl.nii. dzuk;
,sb.= Indication of
illegal drug use,
(ii) SUVU; and chiouin. alw.hoUlUi of th.child Abuse of alcohol by the respondent,
(iii) Suicidal actions or tendencies of the child respondent, and
(iv) Other seriously self-destructive behavior creating an imminent danger to the child's
respondent's life or health.
(4) In determining whether detention is necessary to secure the child's respondent's presence at
the next court hearing, th1flIluMh1
faz, i, de,.,ed relevant factors include but are not limited
to the following:
(i) ehiid's The respondent's residence in the District of Columbia,
(ii) Length of child's the respondent's residence and present community ties,
(iii) Employment and school record of the child respondent.
(iv) Record of child's respondent's appearances at prior court hearings and circumstances
surrounding non-appearances, if any,
(v) Record of child's the respondent'sprevious abseondences from institutions or official custody.
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The judge's authority to order shelter care, as opposed to secure detention, flows
from Section 16-2310(b)' 5 and the criteria set forth in Juvenile Rule 106(b).' 6 The
and circumstances surrounding such abscondences,
(vi) Record of child's respondent's abscondences from home, and circumstances surrounding
such abscondences and the child's respondent's eventual return home, and
(vii) Seriousness of the pending charge and its likelihood of inducing non-appearance.
(5) If detention appears to be justified under the factors listed in subscutitmS subparagraphs
(a)(1),(2),(3), or (4) of this Rule, the person making the detention decision may nevertheless
consider whether the cild' respondent's living arrangements and degree of supervision might justify
release pending adjudication.
(6) No ftHitd respondent who is charged with homicide, forcible rape, robbery while armed,
attempt to commit any such offense, assault with intent to commit any such offense, or burglary in
the first degree, or who is in absondence from Court ordered secure custody shall be released prior
to a detention decision by a judge judicial officer of the Division.
(7) No ctrild
respondent charged with being a person in need of supervision shall be admitted to
a detention facility, except upon order of a judg judicial officer, unless it appears from available
information that immediate detention is necessary to protect the chiltt's respondent's own person
under the criteria listed in subsection subparagraph (a)(3) of this Rule.
15. This subsection provides that "[a] child shall not be placed in shelter care prior to a factfinding
hearing or a dispositional hearing unless it appears from the available information that shelter care is required
- (I) to protect the person of the child, or (2) because the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other
person or agency able to provide supervision and care for him, and the child appears to be unable to care for
himself ...." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(b) (1989 Repl.).
16. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(b). Rule 106(b) (as published in 123 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1441-76
(D.C. Super. Ct. July 24-26, 1995)) provides:
(b)Shelter care. No child respondent who is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision shall
be placed in shelter care prior to a factfinding hearing or a dispositionat hearing, unless it appears
from available information that shelter care is required to protect the person of the chld respondent,
or because the chld respondent has no suitable parent, guardian, custodian, or other person or
agency able to provide supervision and care for tim the respondent and the chidd respondent appears
unable to care for himself or herself.
(I) In determining whether shelter care is necessary to protect the person of the ctild
respondent, the fblluig fa.tLu
d dJ,d
relevant factors include but are not limited to the
following:
(i) Abusive or threatening conduct toward the ctritd
respondent by a member or members of the
family or household,
(ii) Dangerous conduct or threats toward the child respondent by persons in his the respondent's
environment or neighborhood, if the parents, guardian or custodian arc unable to protect the chitd
respondent therefrom, and
(iii) Danger to the health or welfare of the child's respondent's person for which additional
supervision is required short of secure custody.
(2) In determining whether a child respondent alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision
who is without parental or custodial supervision should be placed in shelter care because of inability
to care for himself or herself, the filuiig fta4.t,
,..drned relevant factors Include but are not
limited to the following:
(i) The child's respondent's age,
(ii) Adequacy of child's the respondent's existing living arrangements,
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Code and the Rule distinguish children who require shelter care from those who
require secure detention."7 Rule 106(a) detention factors evidence a goal of

confining children who are dangerous or who present a risk of flight, while Rule
106(b) shelter care factors principally reflect a concern for the welfare and
protection of children themselves. The language of Section 16-2310(a) and (b),
and the parallel, but more detailed language of Rule 106(a) and (b), provide
guidance for judges to distinguish the standards of shelter care placement from
those of secure detention. Children who do not meet the criteria for secure
detention under Section 16-2310(a) and Rule 106(a) are not considered dangerous
to the community and do not pose a risk of flight; thus, they should not be securely
detained.

The practice in the District of Columbia has been for judges to make Section
16-2310(a) and Rule 106(a) findings for secure detention as well as for shelter
care. Virtually every shelter house placement is based on such a finding.' 8

Essentially, judges have adapted to a routine of improperly subsuming Rule 106(b)
orders into Rule 106(a) orders.' 9 This adaptation has accommodated and obscured

(iii) Length of existing living arrangements and child's the respondent's adjustment to them.
and
(iv) Evidence or likelihood of serious harm to chitd's the respondent's ph)sical or mental health
resulting from existing living arrangements, if any.
(3) No child respondent who is judged to be in need of shelter care under D.C. Cede §162310(b) and the provisions of this Rule shall be placed in detention, unless his the respondent's
detention is independently justified under stitU paragraph (a) of this Rule.
COMMENT. This Rule is adopted pursuant to the statutory direction in D.C. Code §16-2310(c).
Tin; %.Li4
UL
1dtl fb!!UW LhUSUbL UUL ALL D.C. eouJ §!6-23Gta, and (b~) dld ll,,!dn Uiift,14
FP i..e PbitiULI Uf ffi Judge u DGelVLiUo Chiaa 4 duptcd by thcjud
uf th D.C. Jub m6 Cu=&
UlI May 4, 197G. Tbrofilic in ubs
(a)(6), mquiruug d6~~
piUl to a dcciuuor b) a jd
UIC tht,. Y
441I;thiubt Tuuidur, it *CLLUL1UJ1
U,
p
.u
.au
de. seCR jumnitcl lG3ta(*
that abscan.deacLc fion urn
t aidezed 4suic LuatUo is, added. Subs-r..iua (a)(9) and (b)(3), am
designed tu ,nuid the a of dutcatr filltLiG as a uabsltunLU fbi IhlI aL.
17. In addition, the INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION'AbIERIcAN BAR AS OC PROJECT O
C"JA.

JUVENILE JUSTICE INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED JuvENiLE

OrFNDERS BETWEEN ARREsT AND D sPoSnoN. STANDARD 3.4(1) (Tent. Draft 1977) notes that "lf9acilities
referred to as 'shelter care' have been intended primarily, if not exclusively, for juveniles accused of noncriminal conduct." [hereinafter ABA STANDARD] (citing National Council on Juvenile Court Judges.
Handbook for New Juvenile Court Judges, 23 Juv. CT. J. 1. 21 (1972)).
18. Indeed, attorneys who monitored initial hearings for one month recently reported no instances in
which judges made Rule 106(b) findings, despite numerous shelter house placement orders. See Infra
Appendix B, at 455. Attorneys who have practiced for many years in the Juvenile Branch of the D.C. Superior
Court Family Division report never having heard nor seen a Rule 106(b) order.
19. See Jeanne Asherman-Jusino, The Right of Children in the Juvenile Justice System to Inclusion In
the Federally Mandated Child Welfare Services System. 3 D.C. L REv. 311, 335-37 (1995).
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the failure of the court and the executive branch agency (the Youth Services
Administration) to establish and maintain a sufficient number of shelter care
beds.

20

The Code and the Rules begin with the presumption that a child may not be
detained unless certain factors establishing dangerousness or a risk of flight are
present.21 Moreover, Rule 106(b) explicitly prohibits placing a child destined for
shelter care in secure detention. Rule 106(b)(3) states that "[n]o respondent who
is judged to be in need of shelter care under D.C. Code § 16-2310(b) and the
provisions of this Rule shall be placed in detention, unless the respondent's
detention is independently justified under paragraph (a) of this Rule."2 2
Furthermore, shelter house placement permits the child to attend school and
otherwise move around in the community and, with rare exceptions, to spend
weekends at home. Therefore, common sense dictates that a child ordered into a
shelter house is not dangerous and does not pose a risk of flight. This conclusion
holds whether the court properly designated shelter house placement under Rule
23
106(b), or improperly under Rule 106(a).
The 1995 amendments to Rule 106, in particular the amendments to 106(a)(3)
relating ostensibly to the detention of children for their own protection, have
partially reconciled the rule with the actual-albeit illegal-practice in superior
court of using secure detention as a substitute for shelter care.24 Accordingly,
20. The decision to place a child in detention, despite an original Rule 106(a) order for placement in a
shelter house, is made by either the initial hearing judge or the Social Services screening team. The courtroom
clerk often provides the initial hearing judge with information concerning bed space availability in shelter
houses. If the clerk's daily information sheet indicates that there is no available shelter house bed, the clerk
will so advise the judge. The judge's original order typically reads "Placement at Oak Hill pending space in
youth shelter house."
21. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(a)-(b) (1989 Repl.); D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)-(b).
22. In addition, Rule 106(b)(1)(iii) recognizes that shelter care is "additional supervision .. .short of
secure custody." Rule 106(a)(7) prohibits the use of secure detention for children charged with a status
offense ("in need of supervision") unless "immediate detention is necessary to protect the respondent's own
person under the criteria listed in subparagraph (a)(3) of th[eJ Rule." Id.
23. In addition, Juvenile Rule 2 provides that when a child is detained, "the Division will secure for (the
child] custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been provided for
[the child] by [the child's] parents." D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 2. Obviously, the less restrictive, home-like
environment of a shelter house in the community is more nearly equivalent to that which the parents should
have provided than the prison environment of secure detention. Thus, where shelter care is ordered
or-whether or not ordered-is appropriate, Rule 2 provides independent authority to prohibit substituting
secure detention. Cf ABA STANDARD, supra note 17, at 3.3(F) (children alleged to be delinquent cannot be
detained "due to a lack of a more appropriate facility or status alternative"); Proposed ABA STANDARD 3.4
(judges required to order the "least intrusive alternative").
24. Indeed, Rule 106(a)(3) in its current form is practically indistinguishable from Rule 106(b). See
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coincident with imposing amendments, the drafters struck, inter alia, the following
language from the comment to Rule 106: "Subsections (a)(7) and (b)(3) are
designed to avoid the use of detention facilities as a substitute for shelter care."
The Rule was designed to effectuate the statute by prohibiting the substitution of

secure detention for shelter care, and- notwithstanding the recent amendments to
the Rule and the deletion of the explicit portion of the comment-the principal
purpose of Rule 106(b)(3)

remains. More fundamentally,

the practice of

preventively detaining children who are not dangerous and who do not pose a risk
of flight nevertheless violates the statute. To the degree that the Rule now appears

to sanction this illegal practice, the rule itself is ultra vires.

II.

SUBSTITUTING SECURE DETENTION FOR SHELTER CARE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

In considering the issue of preventive detention, the Supreme Court, in Schall v.
Martin, has recognized that a juvenile has a fundamental right to be free from

institutional restraint. 25 However, the Court has defined the liberty interest of a
child more narrowly than the equivalent liberty interest of an adult because, in
essence, a child is always in someone's custody (either parent or state). 2° Ruling on
the constitutionality of New York State's pretrial detention statute, the Court held

supra notes 14 & 16. For example, prior to the recent amendments the court could not impose secure
detention based upon illegal drug use unless there was "addiction ... or other severe and chronic drug abuse"
following the amendments, an "indication of illegal drug use" suffices to allow secure detention of a child. This
change is particularly ironic when there is "a virtual epidemic of drug use within the [Oak Hill) facility."
"Twenty-Ninth Report of the Monitor," Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85. at 16 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1995). Similarly, Oak Hill provides an unthinkably hostile environment for a child who,
under Rule 106(b), needs protection from "[a]busive or threatening conduct." Informally, institutional staff
readily acknowledge that every child at Oak Hill must be prepared on a regular basis to fend or fight off
physical attacks.
25. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citing In re Gault, 387 US. I. 27 (1967)).
26. Id. at 265. Commentators have sharply criticized the Court for equating parental and state custody
(and, accordingly, diminishing the liberty interest of juveniles as compared nith the liberty interest of adults),
thus avoiding a true balancing test which would weigh the state's interest against the juvenile's liberty interest.
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MicaL L. REv. 510 (1986); Kevin F. Arthur, Preventive Detention Liberty In
the Balance, 46 Mo. L. REv. 378 (1987); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335 (1990); Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal
Protection Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE U 174, 182 (1985) (positing that "the real
reason juveniles are subject to much harsher pretrial detention statutes than are adults is that the
incarceration of accused juvenile delinquents is an easy way for government officials to look like they are
taking concrete measures to fight crime").
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that the statute did not violate due process requirements.27 Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist analyzed the constitutionality of the statute using a two-part
test: (1) whether preventive detention served any legitimate state interest; and (2)
whether the statute satisfied Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. 5
The Schall Court acknowledged that a "juvenile's countervailing interest in
freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved [in the
Schall challenge], is undoubtedly substantial. '29 The Court found, however, that
"the combined interest in protecting both the community and the juvenile himself
from the consequences of future criminal conduct" 30 meant that "the juvenile's
liberty interest may, in appropriatecircumstances, be subordinated to the State's
'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.' "a
For purposes of the present analysis, the relevant question is whether substituting
secure detention for shelter care following a judicial finding that shelter care is
sufficient to protect the child (and the community) is an appropriatecircumstance
in which to subordinate a child's liberty interest. The Supreme Court has recently
stressed the constitutional importance of liberty in Foucha v. Louisiana.82 In
Foucha, the Court held that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action . . . [and] 'commitment for any purpose constitutes a

significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.' "38
The District's secure detention of children for whom shelter care placement is
decidedly appropriate is clearly distinguishable from the detention at issue in
Schall. In ordering the placement of a child into a shelter house, a superior court
judge implicitly finds that the child does not pose a risk to the community. Shelter
27. Schall, 467 U.S. at 256-57. The Family Court Act, N.Y. Jut. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney
1983), authorizes the secure preadjudicative detention of juveniles after a finding that the juvenile posed a
"serious risk" that the child would commit an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.
Schall was a habeas corpus class action which challenged the decision-making ability of the pretrial detention
laws in New York. The class alleged that the detention decision was imperfect and imprecise, resulting in the
detention of too many non-dangerous children, and that the "risk of erroneous and unnecessary detentions is
too high . . . because the standard for detention is fatally vague." Schall, 467 U.S. at 278.
28. Id. at 263-64.
29. Id. at 265 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27).
30. Id. at 264.
31. Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
32. 504 U.S. 71 (1992); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.").
33. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). The Foucha
Court also stated that "[dlue process requires that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id at 79.
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care is defined by statute as non-secure detention;3 ' shelter care facilities are
unlocked during the day, and the juvenile's movements are unrestricted. The
Schall Court held that the pretrial detention of a juvenile based on the conclusion
that the child poses a threat to community safety is constitutional. However, at
issue for children in the District is whether, once a judge orders a less restrictive
level, there is any legitimate state interest in increasing the level of detention due
to space limitations.35 If no jeopardy exists to the child or the community greater
than that necessitating shelter care, the executive branch of the District of
Columbia government cannot, through its inability to maintain adequate shelter
care facilities, defy a judge's order for shelter care placement. Substituting secure
detention for shelter care is not a necessary regulation of detention conditions.
Rather, it is an incremental, but nonetheless fundamental, encroachment on liberty
that constitutes an "impermissible punishment"; thus, it violates due process.30

III. THE JERRY M. CONSENr DECREE

Through the Jerry M. consent decree, 37 the District of Columbia has agreed
that each class member has a right
not to be confined in any District of Columbia secure juvenile facility if that

34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35. The routine decision in Superior Court to place a child awaiting shelter care in secure detention
implicates unchallenged constitutional interests. In fact, no defense attorney-and no judge sun spante--asks
in an initial hearing what interest the state could posit that would justify the deprivation of liberty. Yet.
presumably, since every child is represented by counsel, receives an in-court hearing, has a right to challenge
and to present evidence, and has a right to appeal the detention determination, there is no procedural due
process violation. One simply must conclude that the initial hearing process in the District is adequate, but
that the legal representation is not. As long as the substitution of secure detention for shelter care gees
unchallenged, children's access to procedural protections is meaningless.
36. See generally Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) and cases cited therein; but cf. Reno
v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (not a violation of due process to deny release from detention to third-party.
non-relative custodians of undocumented children); the interest at stake in Reno v. Flores was characterized
by the Court as the non-fundamental right to be released from detention, rather than the fundamental right
not to be detained. Id. at 1448-49. Additionally, a policy to deny District children freedom from secure
detention because there arc insufficient shelter care beds would violate due process as only individualized
decisions are permissible on issues of fundamental liberty. See id. at 1469 n.30 (Stevens. J.. dissenting)
(Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) was the "'one notable exception" to requirement that
detention determinations be made on a case-by-case basis).
37. See generally. Donna Wulkan, Symposium, The Unnecessary Detention of Juveniles In the District
of Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. 410 (1995).
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child is capable of functioning safely by himself or with the responsible
assistance of others, without a serious danger to himself or others, in a
community-based program.3 8
Under the terms of the consent decree, the District of Columbia also has agreed to
have community bed space available for juveniles accused of delinquent behavior
who satisfy the statutory criteria for shelter care placement. This agreement
precludes the District, through the Corporation Counsel, from requesting or
recommending placement of children in secure detention pending bed space in
shelter care. On this point the court has not adequately enforced the decree, and
Assistant Corporation Counsel in individual cases continue to request or
recommend secure detention for children facing delinquency charges due to the
unavailability of shelter care space. Defense counsel should raise this consent
decree provision at initial hearings in individual delinquency cases, and argue
vociferously that, inter alia, the prosecutor is collaterally and equitably estopped
from requesting secure detention as a substitute for shelter care.
Even if, notwithstanding the analysis in the preceding section, the incremental
deprivation of liberty occasioned by the use of secure detention as a shelter care
equivalent does not violate due process, it is likely that the above-quoted Jerry M.
provision creates a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. This
alternative due process analysis begins with Wolff v. McDonnell.80 In addition to
the liberty interests protected directly by the Constitution, "a person's liberty is
equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the
State."'4 0 Whether a state creates a liberty interest by statute, regulation, or rule,
"a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on
41
official discretion.
Similarly, a consent decree may create a liberty interest "[b]ecause a consent
decree can limit the exercise of official discretion in the same manner as a ...
regulation, [and there is] . . .no reason to treat the two sources of authority
differently. '42 The District of Columbia has expressly imposed a limitation on its

38. Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85, at I (D.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 1986) (consent
decree).
39. 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2297.
40. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
41. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983).
42. Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Dozier v. Hilton, 507 F. Supp.
1299, 1310-11 (D.N.J. 1981) (consent order to which prisoner was a party provided basis for successful claim
regarding prison transfer); cf. Bee v. District of Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (mutual
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discretion to place a juvenile in a secure facility; it cannot place a child in secure
detention if the child could function safely in the community. A court order for
shelter house constitutes a finding that the child could function safely in the
community; therefore, in each such case the District of Columbia is obligated
under the Jerry M. consent decree to provide a shelter house placement. 4 Failure
to have a shelter house bed available inevitably affects the child's freedom' 0 and
raises the specter that individual judges and executive branch officials might be
using preventive detention improperly to punish children prior to a factfinding
4
hearing. "

CONCLUSION

The use of secure detention as a substitute for shelter care violates District of
Columbia statutes and rules, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Moreover, the executive branch of the District of Columbia
government has failed to comply with the requirement of the Jerry M. consent
decree to establish more community-based beds and programs. Ultimately, any

effort to incarcerate a child whom the state could maintain in shelter care (or at
home) is not only misguided in terms of its detrimental effects on the child's
welfare and costs to the city, but it is also unlawful. On the other hand, defense
attorneys have not challenged the illegal substitution of secure detention for shelter

care; nor have any superior court judges or hearing commissioners to date
abstained sua sponte from following the accepted, but patently illegal, practice of
placing children destined for shelter care in secure detention. Indeed, the recent
amendments to the Juvenile Rules are an attempt to formalize the illegal practice.
understandings of settlement agreement that creates special rights for an individual. not a general rule or
regulations, insufficient to ground a liberty interest).
43. Some courts have applied the implicit or "additional requirement" that the language used by the
state to create the liberty interest must "establish[] 'substantive predicates' to govern official decision-making.
and ... mandatef] the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have not been met."
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454. 462 (1989) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). The Supreme Court has retreated from emphasizing the rights mandated by the state's
language (at least, in allowing negative inferences to be drawn from prison regulations). Sandin. 115 S. Ct. at
2299, and has re-emphasized the nature of the substantive deprivation. id. at 2301-02,
44. The District is charged "5100 per day per child for each day over ten that a young person remain[s]
in secure confinement after having been ordered into a group home or shelter house care." Jerry M. v. District
of Columbia, C.A. 1519-85, at 5. (D.C. Super. Ct. May 24, 1985) (Memorandum Order "E").
45. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2302.
46. See id. at 2300.
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This injustice will continue until the City Council or the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals clearly separates from the grasp of secure detention those
children who, although not demonstrably dangerous to others, are to some
remarkable degree exposed to risk of harm from their environment. Allowing the
secure detention of children at Oak Hill for their own protection is absurd; Oak
Hill is a violent and drug-infested institution. Superior court judges cause grave
physical, educational, and emotional harm to children by subjecting them to
preventive detention at Oak Hill. No matter what the court orders say, detained
children who are not dangerous understand that placement at Oak Hill is both
unfair and detrimental to them.

